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†

In response to Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption:
Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789 (2006).
1

In The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, Professor Ruth Colker offers a revisionist interpretation of the part of the
federal special education law that requires:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . [must
be] educated with children who are not disabled, and [that] special
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities
from the regular educational environment [must] occur[] only when
the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
2
achieved satisfactorily.

Professor Colker would not apply this integration presumption, or
would apply it only in the weakest possible form, when the school district complies with its additional obligation under the federal regulations to offer a continuum of services—regular classes, special classes,
special school, home instruction, instruction in hospitals and institutions—and when the district provides for supplementary services, such
as resource room or itinerant teachers, to be delivered in regular class
3
placements.
In this Response, I contend that Professor Colker’s revision is unsupported and would be unwise. But that is not to say that a new way
of looking at the integration presumption is wholly out of order. The
integration presumption should not be applied in a simple-minded
way to say that general education is always best under all circumstances. Instead, the presumption should operate as a presumption
ought to: in the absence of other evidence, it should be the rule. If
the school is arguing for integration, the presumption ought to carry
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some, though not very great, weight. If the parent is arguing for inte4
gration, the presumption should be much stronger. More importantly, the second half of the language of the statutory provision embodying the presumption should be taken seriously. Separate classes
should be used only when supplemental services cannot make general
education work for a given child. The emphasis should be on the services, and the services should be broadly defined to include such
things as co-teaching by special education professionals, aide services,
assistive technology, behavior intervention, and initiatives to prevent
harassment and mistreatment by teachers and peers. The services
should be intense and individualized. When they are delivered separately, they should be temporary or provided outside of the regular
school day.
This Response will first summarize and answer Professor Colker’s
contentions. Second, it will suggest what the focus of the discussion
ought to be, that is, which services and protections are being offered
to educate a child within general education. Finally, it will suggest
that a more nuanced approach to integration fits well with the
broader reform of special education law.
I. THE RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR COLKER’S ARGUMENT
Professor Colker’s argument is that the original purpose of the integration presumption was “to hasten the closing of disability-only in5
stitutions.” She further contends that much of the case law under the
provision applies the presumption too strongly in favor of integrating
6
children with disabilities into regular classes; that educational research does not support the application of a strong presumption in
7
favor of integration; and that an analogy to racial desegregation also
8
does not support a strong disability integration presumption. My
4

Regarding the various approaches to applying legal presumptions, see 2 JOHN W.
STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344, at 443-59 (5th ed. 1999) (describing
the “bursting bubble” theory and competing approaches advocating stronger effects
such as shifts in the burdens of persuasion and instructions to juries).
5
Colker, supra note 1, at 795.
6
Id. at 811-12, 814-21 (discussing Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1983), and Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989)).
7
Id. at 825.
8
Id. at 838. The transmission of disability culture, particularly the culture developed around the use of sign language at state schools, is sometimes cited as a ground
to place children in separate institutions, but Professor Colker does not rely on this
consideration in this paper, and elsewhere seems ambivalent. See Ruth Colker, AntiSubordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415, 1474
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view is that the history of the provision does not have much to do with
deinstitutionalization; the case law she cites is largely beside the point;
educational research supports integration that is done properly; and
the race analogy is not a persuasive argument against a strong integration presumption—indeed in some respects it supports it.
A. History
Professor Colker’s position that Congress created the integration
presumption to hasten the closing of inhumane disability-only institu9
tions caused me to do a double-take. I was a law student in the midto-late 1970s and worked on deinstitutionalization cases in a law
school clinic. During that time, a close friend of mine was a special
education teacher. We had many conversations about deinstitutionalization and about mainstreaming children in school, but the two
topics were related only in the vague sense that both had to do with
disability and the law. When she talked about applying “least restrictive environment” principles in her work, the conversation concerned
such things as her attempts to persuade the regular education secondgrade teacher to take a student with Down Syndrome for part, and
then all, of the day. The point then, as now, was that special classes
for students with disabilities—in the words of the statutory provision,
“removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational en10
vironment” —should occur only when education cannot be provided
in the regular educational setting with extra help and services. True,
schools and institutions that enrolled only children with disabilities
existed then (and do now), but the idea that Congress wanted nothing more than to move children out of those institutions when it enacted § 1412(a)(5)(A) does not fit with reality.
11
A survey of the education literature affirms this conclusion.

(2007) (commenting on the possibility of offering deaf children with cochlear implants the chance to go to mainstream schools and preserving the ability of other deaf
children to study in intensive sign language classrooms). For a discussion of the topic,
see Mark C. Weber, Inclusive Education in the United States and Internationally: Challenges
and Response, 3 REV. DISABILITY STUD. 19, 28-29 (2007).
9
Professor Colker draws to some degree on personal experience in making her
claims, and I will draw on personal experience as well.
10
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2000).
11
So does some of the history recounted in one of Professor Colker’s more recent
papers. See Colker, supra note 8, at 1427-28 (“In the 1960s and 1970s, educators began
to publish articles questioning the effectiveness of self-contained schools and special
education classes. Their work laid the foundation for the concept of ‘least restrictive
alternative’—that children should be educated in the most integrated setting possible.”) (footnotes omitted).
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Education sources from the era around the passage of the Education
12
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 frequently discuss mainstreaming or least-restrictive-environment ideas. Although there are
passing references to deinstitutionalization, the sources focus on the
same topic my friend was discussing: getting students out of selfcontained public school classes and into regular education classes, either part-time or full-time, with adequate support to enable the chil13
dren to thrive there.

12

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400--1482 (2000 & Supp. IV 2005) (now called the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act).
13
See generally Evelyn Deno, Summary of Presentations, in MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN CENTERS 28, 31 (Philip H. Mann ed.,
1974) [hereinafter MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION] (describing conference discussions about the need to change regular education to accommodate children with mild
and moderate disabilities); Albert H. Fink, Implications for Teacher Preparation, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN 101, 103 (A.J. Pappanikou & James L.
Paul eds., 1977) (reporting on a conference held in February, 1975: “The thrust of the
mainstreaming movement . . . has aimed at providing handicapped children with educational services that depend less heavily than in the past upon special self-contained
classes, combined with a greater utilization of the regular classroom. The former
placements have been viewed as inadequate for many handicapped children . . . .”);
Frank M. Hewett, The Orchestration of Success, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 80, 84 (discussing the potential for creative efforts by educators in regular classrooms to improve the educational experience of all children
while accommodating children with emotional disturbance); Richard A. Johnson &
Rita M. Grismer, The Harrison-University Cooperative Resource Center, in MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 84, 84 (describing efforts from the mid-1960s to move children from Educable Mentally Retarded special class settings to regular classes); Philip
H. Mann & Rose Marie McClung, Training Regular Teachers in Learning Disabilities, in
MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 110, 110 (discussing the need for regular
classroom teachers to prepare to serve atypical learners); Charles A. Meisgeier, The
Houston Plan—Retraining of Regular Classroom Teachers To Work with Handicapped Children
Within the Regular Classroom Setting, in MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 77, 77
(describing the training of master teachers in methods of serving children with disabilities in regular classrooms with personalized programs for all children); William C.
Morse, The Psychology of Mainstreaming Socio-Emotionally Disturbed Children, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 18, 18 (“Special education
professionals range in opinion about mainstreaming from seeing it as a loss of financial and operational control to helping children to the dawn of the new day when special education is about to direct and reform the total educational establishment.”);
James L. Paul, Mainstreaming Emotionally Disturbed Children, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 1, 2 (“Mainstreaming, if taken in its narrowest sense of moving children from special classes to regular classes, raises some very
basic questions.”); id. at 12-13 (“Children who are in special classes and could profit
more from an instructional program in the regular classroom should be moved to the
regular classroom with the necessary supportive services to make that adaptation successful.”); Phyllis F. Perelman & Wayne L. Fox, Training Regular Classroom Teachers To
Provide Special Education Services: The Consulting Teacher Program, in MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 134, 134 (noting that the rural nature of Vermont renders
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That being so, there is no reason to be baffled at the integration
presumption embodied in the consent decree in Pennsylvania Ass’n for
14
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC), a prime influence on the
federal special education law. The case, which was not about deinstitutionalization, concerned appropriate education for children with
mental retardation who either were not in the public schools at all or
15
were served in inadequate programs. The parties drafted the decree
in accordance with the advice of educators about the best approach to
educating children with mental retardation, and so it came out adopt16
ing the same proposition as the contemporary educational literature
and, for that matter, my friend: place children in regular education
whenever possible, giving them adequate services to make main17
streaming work. It is no shock that there is no explanation in the
special classes impractical in many areas); Maynard C. Reynolds, Introduction to SPECIAL
EDUCATION AND SCHOOL SYSTEM DECENTRALIZATION 1, 6 (Maynard C. Reynolds ed.,
1975) (“Mainstreaming is not a new concept although the term is new and has come
into prominence only recently. For many decades, children with mild handicaps and
learning problems had been admitted to regular classrooms where they were expected
to keep up as well as they could with minimal or no extra assistance. . . . The current
concept of mainstreaming embodies a supportive structure.”); William C. Rhodes, Beyond Abnormality: Into the Mainstream, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED
CHILDREN, supra, at 31, 36-37 (noting the contemporaneous deinstitutionalization
movement, but primarily linking mainstreaming and deinstitutionalization as two
among many phenomena tied to new progressive social consciousness); H. Rutherford
Turnbull III, Legal Implications, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 43, 45-46 (stating that the mainstreaming preference arises from unequal educational opportunities because of the frequent placement of children with
special needs in the worst facilities with the least capable teachers and poor funding,
and drawing a comparison to racial segregation); University Programs in Teacher Training, in MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 106, 106-09 (discussing five programs used to train regular classroom teachers in understanding aspects of disability
and special education); Richard J. Whelan, Human Understanding of Human Behavior, in
MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 64, 64-66 (noting that
models of education for children with emotional disturbance developed in residential
facilities but moved by the 1960s to public schools and day facilities); Ernest P. Willenberg, The Three D’s: Decategorization, Declassification, and Desegregation, in MAINSTREAM
SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 21, 21-22 (noting that the phase of deinstitutionalization
of children occurred after World War II, and describing the current phase as that of
replacing special day schools, centers, and classes with mainstream instruction); Frank
H. Wood, Implications for Leadership Training, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 89, 90 (explaining that the “‘least restrictive’ situation”
principle encourages educators to remove children from regular school situations only
“for the shortest possible time and to the shortest possible distance,” such as in parttime resource rooms or special programs in the same building).
14
343 F. Supp. 279, 306-16 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (presenting the amended consent
agreement).
15
Id. at 282-83.
16
See sources cited supra note 13.
17
PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 307.
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opinion that accompanies the decree. The primary purpose of the
opinion was to establish a colorable constitutional claim to give jurisdiction to the court for entering a decree at all. There was no reason
to justify every term of what the parties agreed to.
There is not much discussion of the integration presumption in
the legislative history of the Education of the Handicapped Act, as it
was amended up until the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975 (EAHCA). This absence, though, hardly supports the idea
18
that deinstitutionalization was the objective of the provision. The
more logical explanation for the lack of lengthy discussion of integration in the legislative history of the EAHCA and its predecessors is that
by the 1970s mainstreaming of children with disabilities in regular
education classes had become best educational practice. This explanation is reinforced by a passage in the House Report on the EAHCA
stating, “The [House] Committee urges that where possible and
where most beneficial to the child, special educational services be
provided in a classroom situation. An optimal situation, of course,
19
would be one in which the child is placed in a regular classroom.”
The point, then, is that the statutory presumption’s pedigree is
educational theory and practice; the presumption is only tangentially
related to deinstitutionalization. It is better to assume that Congress
meant what its language denotes than to attribute an unwritten meaning to limit the presumption’s application to deinstitutionalization.
B. Case Law
Not surprisingly, Professor Colker criticizes several cases interpreting the integration presumption on the ground that they apply it in
accordance with a broad purpose rather than the more narrow pur20
pose she attributes to it. Surprisingly, however, Professor Colker’s
18

In fact, closing institutions for children was the focus of a portion of the 1974
Education Amendments different from the provisions that eventually became the EAHCA. This initiative allocated impact funding to school districts receiving children
discharged from state-operated schools and hospitals. The funding carried the express
purpose of promoting deinstitutionalization. See H.R. REP. No. 93-805, at 24 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4093, 4115 (“It is the Committee’s hope that this provision will afford the greatest encouragement to the states to initiate and accelerate programs designed to de-institutionalize as many of these children as possible.”).
19
H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 9 (1975) (emphasis added). The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare quoted this passage in the Federal Register pages explaining the proposed regulations under that law. Education of Handicapped Children and Incentive Grants Program, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,966, 56,972 (Dec. 30, 1976).
20
None of the cases Professor Colker cites, nor any of the legislative history, sup-
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survey of the relevant case law stops abruptly at the end of the 1980s,
and contains only passing references to more recent cases. This omission prevents her from identifying the principal controversy over integration in the 1990s and 2000s.
The current controversy is not over whether application of the integration presumption should be broad, though from time to time
writers have argued that the provision should be limited in accor21
dance with cases such as DeVries v. Fairfax County School Board and
22
A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School District (which Professor Colker criticizes
23
for applying the presumption too weakly). The current controversy
is over the services to be provided in the regular classroom to make
integration work. To a lesser degree, there are also controversies over
using civil rights law to prevent harassment of students with disabilities
(so as to make integration succeed and make it an attractive option
for children and parents), and over how much deference to give
school districts in decisions over integration. These issues are discussed in greater detail below.
C. Educational Literature
In her review of the literature, Professor Colker mostly argues that
there are insufficient numbers of controlled studies of large populations to show that the educational benefits of regular instruction are
24
greater than those of separate instruction. Various experts in the
field survey the literature and come to conclusions contrary to Profes25
sor Colker’s on this point. Professor Colker notes that many authori-

ports the contention that § 1412(a)(5)(A) should magically vanish when the school
has a complete range of placements available. That duty is an independent one under
the federal regulations. Continuum of Alternative Placements, 34 C.F.R. § 300.115
(2007).
21
882 F.2d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 1989).
22
813 F.2d 158, 164 (8th Cir. 1987).
23
There is a legal literature discussing integration and the integration presumption, but Professor Colker does not refer to it. The scholarship includes: Anne Proffitt
Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: The Case Against “Inclusion,” 72 WASH. L. REV.
775 (1997); Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 189; Mark C. Weber, The Least Restrictive Environment Obligation as an Entitlement to Educational Services: A Commentary, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 147 (2001);
Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL
L. REV. 599 (1995); Joshua Andrew Wolfe, Note, A Search for the Best IDEA: Balancing the
Conflicting Provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1627 (2002).
24
See Colker, supra note 1, at 825 (stating that the available evidence is insufficient
to warrant an integration presumption).
25
See, e.g., Jose Blackorby et al., Relationships Between the School Programs of Students
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ties supporting integration allow for use of resource rooms or other
limited forms of separate instruction, and that is undoubtedly correct,
although it appears that what resource-room services entail is not uniform. Primarily, she gathers authorities that stress that inclusive programs have to be designed carefully to be successful and must provide
for significant assistive services and accommodations for main26
streamed students. On this last proposition, I emphatically agree.
D. The Race Analogy
Professor Colker devotes twice as much page space to discussing
literature about the educational benefits of racial integration as she
does to discussing literature about the educational benefits of placing
children with disabilities in the mainstream. As she acknowledges, the
27
analogy between race and disability is flawed. To the extent that it is
relevant, what it suggests is that integration requires special efforts to
be successful. Professor Colker says that, when applied to integration
of children with disabilities, the lessons of racial integration are as follows:
1) Schools need to teach tolerance and promote cooperation.
2) Teachers in regular education need training in educating students
with special needs.

with Disabilities and Their Longitudinal Outcomes, in WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE? INFLUENCES ON OUTCOMES FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 7-1, 7-7 (2007) (“Bivariate
analyses show that, across measures, students with disabilities who took more academic
classes in general education settings had greater academic success than peers who took
fewer classes there.”); Rebecca A. Hines, Inclusion in Middle Schools, ERIC DIGEST, Dec.
2001, available at http://www.ericdigests.org/2002-3/inclusion.htm (collecting studies); Wayne Sailor & Blair Roger, Rethinking Inclusion: Schoolwide Applications, 86 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 503, 504 (2005) (“[T]he sum of available evidence overwhelmingly
supports integrated instructional approaches over those that are categorically segregated, regardless of the categorical label or severity of the disability.” (footnote omitted)); see also Michael F. Giangreco, Extending Inclusive Opportunities, 64 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 34, 34-37 (2007) (providing a framework for how teachers should handle the
inclusion of students with significant disabilities within mainstream classrooms); Annette Holahan & Virginia Costenbader, A Comparison of Developmental Gains for Preschool
Children with Disabilities in Inclusive and Self-Contained Classrooms, 20 TOPICS IN EARLY
CHILDHOOD SPECIAL EDUC. 224, 233-34 (2000) (reporting on two studies that show
better performance in the socio-emotional domain for children in inclusive preschool
settings); Patrick A. Schwarz, Special Education: A Service, Not a Sentence, 64 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 39-42 (2007) (reporting a case study about a wayward disabled student). See
generally sources cited supra note 13 (collecting 1970s sources, which heavily support
mainstreaming).
26
See Colker, supra note 1, at 826-35.
27
Id. at 838 n.183.
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3) Individualization matters.
4) Mainstreaming should begin early.
5) Parental involvement is crucial.
6) Smaller schools often work better than large ones.
7) And (almost as an afterthought), harassment has to be taken seri28
ously.

None of these revelations undermines the value of a broad integration
presumption for children with disabilities. Moreover, as Colker notes,
African-Americans are significantly overrepresented in the mental re29
tardation and emotional disturbance disability categories. That fact
alone supports vigorous inclusion efforts so that placement in special
education does not become racial resegregation. It does not warrant
supplanting the disability integration presumption with the continuum-of-services requirement.
II. THE REAL ISSUE
The real issue in the debate over the application of the disability
integration presumption is the presence or absence of related services
for the child in the integrated setting. The educational literature
identifies related services as the means to success in a mainstreamed
placement. The related-services issue emerges in current decisions
from the courts, and it is the key to resolving the current controversies
in the schools.
A. In the Courts
The case law has come to reflect the true problem with regard to
applying the disability presumption. Two critical cases from the 1990s
are Sacramento City Unified School District, Board of Education v. Rachel
30
31
H. and Oberti v. Board of Education. In Rachel H., the Ninth Circuit
required the placement of a child with mental retardation in a fulltime regular education program with the help of a part-time aide and
32
other assistance. The school wanted to mainstream her for art, music, lunch, and recess, but not for academic subjects. The court
placed weight on the testimony of the parents’ experts and the child’s
28

See id. at 850-53.
Id. at 853.
30
14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
31
995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993). Professor Colker mentions these cases in a footnote discussing multifactor tests used in applying the presumption. Colker, supra note
1, at 812 n.90.
32
The child’s IQ was said to be 44. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400.
29
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teacher in her mainstreamed setting, and relied especially on the
child’s progress in social and communication skills when in that environment. The court adopted a test that focused on, among other
considerations, the “educational benefits available to Rachel in a regular classroom, supplemented with appropriate aids and services, as compared with the educational benefits of a special education class33
room.” In Oberti, the Third Circuit required a school district to place
34
a child with Down Syndrome in a mainstreamed class. The court acknowledged that a mainstreamed class had previously been unsuccessful for the child, but stressed that no supplemental aids and services
35
had been provided. The evidence showed that the child could succeed if provided services, such as the assistance of an itinerant special
education instructor, special education training for the regular education teacher, modification of the curriculum, parallel instruction, and
36
part-time use of a resource room.
The court in Oberti put the emphasis where it belongs, on the services to be provided:
One of our principal tasks in this case is to provide standards for determining when a school’s decision to . . . place [a] child in a segregated
environment violates IDEA’s presumption in favor of mainstreaming.
This issue is particularly difficult in light of the apparent tension within
the Act between the strong preference for mainstreaming and the requirement that schools provide individualized programs tailored to the
specific needs of each disabled child.
The key to resolving this tension appears to lie in the school’s proper
37
use of “supplementary aids and services” . . . .

Courts have begun to recognize the need to act creatively to make
integration work. L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo School District involved a
child with autism, for whom the school district proposed a nonmainstreamed preschool placement with a few nondisabled children
38
participating. The program also featured speech therapy, occupational therapy, and eight to fifteen hours per week of applied behavioral analysis (ABA) services. The court rejected this proposal and
upheld the parents’ position that the child should continue in a pri-

33

Id. (emphasis added) (describing the district court’s reasoning, as later adopted
by the Ninth Circuit).
34
995 F.2d at 1206-07.
35
Id. at 1220-21.
36
Id. at 1222.
37
Id. at 1214 (citations and footnote omitted).
38
379 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 2004).
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vate, mainstreamed preschool class with the assistance of an aide, and
with thirty-five to forty hours of ABA services delivered primarily at
39
home. The evidence showed that the extensive ABA services were
necessary to enable the child to function in a mainstreamed school
environment. Although eight to fifteen hours would have permitted
some educational progress, the test the court applied was how many
40
hours were needed to enable the child to succeed in a regular class.
The court thus required additional services—the ABA—but outside
the regular school day, so that the child could be in the mainstream
during the school day and thrive there. The task for the future is to
make integration work through judicious use of intensive services,
sometimes separate, sometimes temporary, and whenever possible
41
outside of regular school hours.

39

Id. at 977-79.
See id. at 976-77.
41
Many courts, though not all, have also begun to take seriously the problem of
harassment of students with disabilities. Space does not permit a full development of
this topic here, but it should be noted that many recent decisions have upheld damages claims and other remedies where schools have failed to take stern action against
peer and staff harassment. See MARK C. WEBER, DISABILITY HARASSMENT 61-97 (2007)
(discussing current case law). Unfortunately, many courts have barred relief for these
claims, a reality that interferes immensely with the goal of integration. See, e.g.,
Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (denying a
tuition reimbursement remedy to parents who placed their emotionally disturbed
child in a private school following his harassment in public school). Many courts have
also been excessively deferential regarding school district decisions to place children
in segregated settings, letting the general rule that public school officials have control
over decisions of educational methodology override the specific congressional command in favor of integration. See Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 41-45 (2006) [hereinafter Weber, Reflections] (discussing an example of inappropriate deference to public school
decisionmaking in School District of Wisconsin Dells v. Z.S. ex rel. Littlegeorge, 295
F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2002)). At the turn of this past century, systemic litigation also began to address service delivery procedures and how they impede or promote integration. See, e.g., Reid L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 358 F.3d 511, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an effort to overturn a consent decree requiring integration and the provision
of services to facilitate it); Reid L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 289 F.3d 1009, 1023 (7th
Cir. 2002) (same); Gaskin v. Pennsylvania, 389 F. Supp. 2d 628, 631-36 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(approving a class action settlement to promote the placement of children in mainstream settings, expand related services and accommodations, and establish monitoring procedures); J.G. v. Bd. of Educ., 26 IDELR 114, 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (entering a
consent decree providing for the inclusive education of children with disabilities); see
also Lopez v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 385 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1002-04 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff in systemic litigation over the provision of services in the least restrictive environment).
40
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B. In the Schools
As Professor Colker’s personal reflections suggest, many parents
resist efforts to integrate their children. Many school districts resist
integration as well. I submit that the parental resistance is rarely due
to sophisticated evaluation of the educational research. Parents’ concerns about adequacy of education are usually based on information
or beliefs about the specific integrated options being offered to their
child. In many instances, the children are already in integrated public
school programs, and whatever is happening is not good. Adequate
support services may not be offered. Services promised may not be
delivered. The general education teachers may not be cooperating.
Class sizes may be too large. Physical or verbal harassment may be occurring. A disability-only school, particularly a private school, looks
extremely attractive.
When parents resist for these reasons, one is hard-pressed to say
they are wrong. Perhaps they should fight for integration that works,
but their children are growing up rapidly, and the adaptive preference of a separate program makes sense for them. Law often imposes
presumptions based on an unscientific calculation of which position is
more frequently justified. When parents resist integration, the presumption in favor of the integrated option proposed by the public
schools should not be a strong one. It should be dispelled by evidence that the school’s specific proposal, as likely to be implemented,
42
will not be successful for a given child.
When the school authorities resist parental efforts to obtain more
integrated settings for their children, it may be because they think
that effective services cannot be provided in the mainstream. It may
be, however, that the services could be given there but would be
costly, and the state’s allocation of special education funding favors
43
services in separate settings. It may also be that general education
personnel resist having the child in an integrated class. For many
educators, special education remains a place to send the child, rather
than a bundle of services to help the child. When the public school
resists integration and the parents push for it, the balance of prob42

This is a different rule from what Professor Colker advocates. The question is
not whether the school has a continuum of services available. It is how good the chosen option is for a specific child.
43
This appears to have been much of the motivation in Rachel H. See Sacramento
City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)
(addressing the school district’s claim that it would lose funding if Rachel H. spent less
than “51% of the day” in a special education class).
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abilities tips in favor of the parents’ position. There is enough risk
that the district is motivated by cost, internal politics, or standard operating procedure to call for a strong presumption in favor of the in44
tegrated option.
CONCLUSION: A NUANCED APPROACH
The integration presumption should stay, but it should be applied
in a nuanced fashion. The integration need not always be total, or at
least temporarily not total. The focus should be on the intensity of
services provided to facilitate success in the mainstream. When parents resist integrated settings for their children, it is crucial to scrutinize the quality of the services offered and assess whether they truly
will enable the child to succeed in general education. When schools
resist providing the integrated setting, it is crucial to look hard at the
school’s motivations.
A nuanced approach to applying the integration presumption fits
well with meaningful reform of special education law. Children with
disabilities, except for the small minority with verifiably severe cognitive impairments, should be achieving at grade level with their peers,
and even those with severe cognitive impairments should be on a parallel track. The way to attain equal achievement is not to separate the
students with disabilities, and certainly not to send them away for long
periods of time to segregated classes where expectations inevitably decline. The way to equality is to provide extra services, technology, and
accommodations in regular classes so that the children with disabilities do not fall behind. Any removal should be temporary and specifically targeted to help the children thrive in general education settings.
Whatever one thinks of the testing regime established by the No Child
45
Left Behind initiative, it is essential to have the special education
subgroup attain the same level of educational success as the general
44

The approach I advocate would not employ any presumption that the school
district is correct simply because it is the school district. See Weber, Reflections, supra
note 41, at 44. Professor Colker criticizes my approach because it looks at the probabilities in contested cases. Colker, supra note 1, at 861 n.258. What the courts are doing with the presumption is, of course, applying it to contested cases. But even in cases
that are not contested, the educational research confirms that integrated programs
with full support services are the best option for the vast range of students. See sources
cited supra note 23. Thus, the probabilities on the whole support the presumption.
45
20 U.S.C. § 6311 (Supp. IV 2004). It may be argued that the application of
group standards undermines the individualized focus of IDEA, see Gordon, supra note
23, at 219-20, but the idea that grade-level achievement ought to be a minimum expectation for everyone is not inconsistent with individualized instruction to achieve that
goal or other individual goals.
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population, and that ought to be the job of the school system as a
whole. The President’s Commission on Excellence in Special Education was correct in declaring that “[c]hildren placed in special education are general education children first. . . . Qualifying for special
education [ought to be] . . . a gateway to more effective instruction
46
and strong intervention.” Special education should mean support,
not exile.
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